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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Thomas McCandless appeals the District Court's denial 
of his habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, 
alleging that his conviction for murder and related charges 
in a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas violated his 
federal constitutional and statutory rights. McCandless's 
appeal presents four claims for habeas relief. First, he 
contends that admission of a prosecution witness' double 
hearsay testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. Second, he argues that a District Attorney's 
Office official's testimony regarding the "corroboration" 
condition of the cooperation agreement between that office 
and the prosecution's key witness amounted to improper 
prosecutorial vouching and deprived him of due process. 
Third, McCandless contends that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to try him because Pennsylvania extradited him 
from New Jersey in violation of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act. Fourth, McCandless claims that admission 
of the prosecution's key witness' preliminary hearing 
testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 
 
We conclude that McCandless's first two claims are 
procedurally defaulted and that his third is without merit. 
However, because we conclude that the prosecution did not 
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fulfill its duty to protect McCandless's constitutional right 
to confront the key witness against him, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
On August 11, 1980, Philadelphia police arrived at a 
crime scene where Theodore Stebelski had been shot to 
death. An eyewitness at the scene, William Hopkins, told 
police that he had heard gunshots coming from a garage 
rented by McCandless located at 2206 East Fletcher Street 
in Philadelphia. According to Hopkins, after the gunshots, 
Stebelski crashed through the garage door, collapsed on the 
sidewalk, picked himself up, and ran around the corner 
finding refuge against a blue Buick parked nearby. Hopkins 
then observed another man, later identified as John Barth, 
running from the garage. Barth quickly returned to the 
garage to assist another man in removing the collapsed 
garage door from a blue Chevrolet. The other man sped 
away in the Chevrolet once it was freed. McCandless owned 
a 1955 Chevrolet similar to the one Hopkins observed. 
Barth then ran to the blue Buick where the bleeding 
Stebelski lay, grabbed Stebelski by the neck and shook 
him. After Hopkins intervened, Barth sped away in the 
Buick. Police and a medical rescue unit soon arrived. 
Despite the rescue unit's efforts, however, Stebelski died of 
two gunshot wounds to the shoulder and trunk of his body. 
 
Police arrested Barth for the Stebelski murder. After 
negotiations with the District Attorney's office, Barth agreed 
to serve as a cooperating witness and gave a statement 
implicating McCandless and Patrick Hartey in the murder. 
In return, prosecutors promised that, if Barth's information 
was corroborated by investigators, they would (i) facilitate 
his release on bail, and (ii) at the successful conclusion of 
the case, drop the charges against him. 
 
On September 15, 1981, the Commonwealth filed 
criminal complaints charging McCandless and Hartey with 
Stebelski's murder and issued warrants for their arrest. At 
the time, however, McCandless and Hartey were both 
incarcerated in New Jersey on unrelated offenses. 
Accordingly, Pennsylvania began extradition proceedings 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IAD"). 
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See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 19101. McCandless's 
extradition was sought on the basis of theft and drug 
offenses unrelated to the Stebelski murder. Despite 
McCandless's resistance, he was extradited on February 17, 
1982. 
 
The Commonwealth prosecuted McCandless and Hartey 
jointly for the Stebelski murder. At a preliminary hearing, 
Barth, the only eyewitness to the shooting inside the 
garage, testified about the murder. Barth stated that 
McCandless had "pistol whipped" and shot Stebelski in the 
back as he fled. After the hearing, Barth disappeared and 
did not testify at McCandless's trial. Barth's preliminary 
hearing testimony, however, was admitted at trial. 
 
The trial judge made three significant evidentiary 
decisions which form the basis of three of McCandless's 
four claims for habeas relief. First, the court determined 
that Barth was "unavailable" and allowed Barth's 
preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury. 
Second, the court allowed Joseph Murray, chief of the 
Homicide Unit of the District Attorney's Office, to testify 
regarding the terms of Barth's cooperation agreement, 
including two statements regarding the agreement's 
"corroboration" condition. Third, the court admitted alleged 
double hearsay testimony by Stebelski's friend, David 
Antovich, who had driven Stebelski to McCandless's garage 
on the day of the crime. Antovich testified that, while he 
was waiting for Stebelski, an unidentified man told him 
that "Tommy said to take a ride and come back infive 
minutes." McCandless's first name is Thomas. 
 
On August 20, 1982, the jury found McCandless guilty of 
first degree murder, criminal conspiracy and possession of 
an instrument of crime. The court sentenced McCandless to 
mandatory life imprisonment on the murder count and an 
aggregate consecutive prison term of seven and one half to 
fifteen years on the other charges. 
 
McCandless appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court raising approximately thirty claims of error. 
The Superior Court affirmed the murder and conspiracy 
convictions, but vacated the possession conviction. 
Commonwealth v. McCandless, 512 A.2d 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
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1986)(table). McCandless then filed an application for 
permission to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
The application abandoned the majority of McCandless's 
Superior Court claims and listed only four grounds for 
relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the 
application for discretionary review. See Commonwealth v. 
McCandless, 522 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1987)(table). 
 
Nine years later, on March 21, 1996, McCandlessfiled a 
petition for habeas corpus relief in the District Court. The 
District Court rejected all thirteen claims presented in his 
petition. As we have noted, McCandless appeals the District 
Court's resolution of only four of these claims. This court 
granted McCandless's application for a certificate of 
probable cause and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253. AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments do not apply 
to this case because McCandless's application was filed 
prior to, and was pending on, AEDPA's effective date. See 
Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); United States v. 
Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
"Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state 
court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our 
review [of the District Court's decision] is plenary." Hassine 
v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir. 1998)(citing 
Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Like the District Court, we must presume all state court 
factual findings to be correct, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), but we 
"exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on 
mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law." 
Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104, 105 (1985)(holding that while "subsidiary factual 
questions" are subject to S 2254(d)'s presumption, the 
ultimate legal question of confession's constitutional 
voluntariness "is a matter for independent federal 
determination"); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 
(1982)(ultimate question of pretrial identification 
procedure's constitutionality presented "mixed question of 
law and fact that is not governed by S 2254(d)"); Daniel v. 
Warden, State Correction Inst. at Huntingdon, Pa., 794 F.2d 
880, 883 (3d Cir. 1986) (S 2254(d) factual presumption does 
not apply to ultimate legal question of whether 
constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated). 
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II. 
 
Federal courts have the power to entertain habeas corpus 
applications by persons in state custody claiming that they 
"[are] in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(a). As a 
general rule, federal courts may exercise the power to 
consider habeas applications only where "it appears that 
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State." Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 
(3d Cir. 1995)(quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)). The exhaustion 
rule requires applicants to "fairly present" federal claims to 
state courts before bringing them in federal court. See 
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. 
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Lambert v. Blackwell, 
134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1998). When a claim is not 
exhausted because it has not been "fairly presented" to the 
state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant 
from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion 
requirement is satisfied because there is "an absence of 
available State corrective process." 28 U.S.C.S 2254(b). In 
such cases, however, applicants are considered to have 
procedurally defaulted their claims and federal courts may 
not consider the merits of such claims unless the applicant 
establishes "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental 
miscarriage of justice" to excuse his or her default. See 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 
 
The parties agree that McCandless is procedurally barred 
from asserting his claims in the Pennsylvania state courts. 
Thus, any claim not already fairly presented to 
Pennsylvania's courts would be procedurally defaulted. 
Accordingly, we may only consider the merits of 
McCandless's habeas claims in either of two circumstances. 
First, we may consider any exhausted claim that 
McCandless "fairly presented" to Pennsylvania's courts. 
Second, even if we conclude that McCandless did not"fairly 
present" a particular claim, we may still consider its merits 
if McCandless excuses his procedural default by 
demonstrating "cause and prejudice" or a "miscarriage of 
justice." 
 
The District Court determined that McCandless had not 
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fairly presented his double hearsay and prosecutorial 
vouching claims to the state courts.1 We agree. 
 
To "fairly present" a claim, a petitioner must present a 
federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state 
courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal 
claim is being asserted. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 
4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). 
It is not sufficient that a "somewhat similar state-law claim 
was made." Harless, 459 U.S. at 6. Yet, the petitioner need 
not have cited "book and verse" of the federal constitution. 
Picard, 404 U.S. at 277. 
 
The Supreme Court most recently applied these 
principles in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995). There, 
the habeas applicant had been convicted in state court for 
sexual molestation. The trial court admitted testimony by 
the parent of a child who claimed to have been molested by 
the applicant 20 years earlier. The applicant's state appeal 
claimed that the trial court erred in admitting the parent's 
testimony without making any reference to federal law. The 
state courts analyzed and rejected the claim under 
California constitutional and evidence law. The applicant 
then filed a federal habeas corpus application claiming the 
evidentiary error deprived him of his constitutional due 
process rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the applicant 
had "fairly presented" his federal claim to the state courts 
because "it is not necessary to invoke `the talismanic 
phrase "due process of law' " or cite the `book and verse on 
the federal constitution' " to notify state courts of federal 
claims. Id. at 366 (citing Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
federal claim had not been fairly presented to the state 
courts. 
 
We read Duncan as reaffirming the teaching of Harless 
and Picard that the absence of explicit reference to federal 
law does not resolve the issue of whether a federal claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court determined that McCandless had "fairly presented" 
his IAD claim and his claim that admitting Barth's preliminary hearing 
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Our review of the record 
confirms the District Court's conclusion. Accordingly, we consider the 
merits of these claims infra in section III of this opinion. 
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was fairly presented. It also reaffirms, however, that 
petitioners must have communicated to the state courts in 
some way that they were asserting a claim predicated on 
federal law. As the Court explained: 
 
       [E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 
       `fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in 
       order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon 
       and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal 
       rights. If state courts are to be given the opportunity to 
       correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, 
       they must surely be alerted to the fact that the 
       prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 
       Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 
       that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied 
       him the due process of law guaranteed by the 
       Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in 
       federal court, but in state court. 
 
Id. at 365-66 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 
In Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, De. County, Pa., 959 
F.2d 1227 (3d Cir 1992), we noted some of the ways in 
which petitioners may communicate that they are asserting 
a federal claim without explicitly referencing specific 
portions of the federal constitution or statutes. Quoting 
from Daye v. Attorney General of New York, 696 F.2d 186 
(2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), we observed that the required 
message can be conveyed through "(a) reliance on pertinent 
federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance 
on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact 
situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular 
as to call to mind a specific right protected by the 
Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts that is 
well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation." 
Evans, 959 F.2d at 1232. As in Duncan, however, the 
petitioner here did not, by these means or any other, serve 
fair notice that he was asserting either of his due process 
claims. 
 
McCandless's "double hearsay" claim in state court made 
no reference to a constitutional or federal right and cited 
only state cases considering state evidence law without 
employing any constitutional analysis.2  McCandless's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court of Common Pleas opinion cited one case, Commonwealth v. 
Darden, 457 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1983), involving a pure matter of state 
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Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Court briefs do not 
assert this claim in "terms so particular as to bring to 
mind" a constitutional right, nor do they "allege a pattern 
of facts well within the mainstream of constitutional 
litigation." To the contrary, this "double hearsay" claim 
brings to mind a classic evidence issue which is precisely 
how it was understood by the state courts. 
 
Similarly, McCandless presented his "prosecutorial 
vouching" claim to Pennsylvania's courts as an evidentiary 
law challenge and not as a violation of a federal or 
constitutional right. He did not assert this claim in terms 
that bring to mind a constitutional right. On the contrary, 
his Superior and Pennsylvania Supreme Court briefs 
articulated this claim in terms similar to a Rule 403 
objection, contending that the cooperation agreement 
testimony was "irrelevant" and "prejudicial" and therefore 
improperly admitted. Nowhere are the terms "constitution", 
"due process" or even "fair trial" mentioned. The cases cited 
were predominantly state cases that considered state 
evidence law issues and did not employ constitutional 
analysis.3 Finally, we note that there is no similarity in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
evidence law. The Superior Court affirmed without citing authority. 
McCandless's Superior Court brief confined its argument to state 
evidence law and cited Commonwealth v. Floyd, 476 A.2d 414 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984), Commonwealth v. Cruz, 414 A.2d 1032 (Pa. 1980), 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 A.2d 91 (Pa. 1983), Commonwealth v. Little, 
364 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1976), Commonwealth v. Cimorose, 478 A.2d 1318 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), all state cases involving evidence law issues. 
McCandless's Pennsylvania Supreme Court brief did not cite any 
additional authority. 
 
3. The Court of Common Pleas opinion cited Commonwealth v. Reed, 446 
A.2d 311 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1982), which dealt with state evidence law and 
a prosecutor's state law ethical duty to present their case "fairly." It 
held 
that improper vouching was a violation of this duty. Reed did not 
consider a constitutional claim. McCandless's Superior Court brief also 
cited Reed and additionally Commonwealth v. Cygan, 243 A.2d 476 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1968), which dealt with state evidence law. The Superior 
Court affirmed without discussion. McCandless's Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court brief cited Floyd, Cygan, Cruz, and Reed and additionally 
Commonwealth v. Tann, 459 A.2d 322, (Pa. 1983); none employed 
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analysis applicable to these two claims. In state court, 
resolution required a determination of relevancy and a 
balancing of possible prejudicial effect. McCandless's claim 
that the same facts amounted to prosecutorial vouching in 
violation of due process involves an inquiry as to whether 
the prosecutorial misconduct undermined the fundamental 
fairness of the entire trial. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 183 (1986); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 
1239 (3d Cir. 1992)(en banc). Accordingly, here, as in 
Duncan, the state courts "analyzed the evidentiary error by 
asking whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its 
probative value, not whether it was so inflammatory as to 
prevent a fair trial." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. 
 
Thus, we conclude that McCandless did not fairly present 
his double hearsay and prosecutorial vouching claims to 
Pennsylvania's courts. Because McCandless is procedurally 
barred from asserting these claims in state court, his 
claims are considered exhausted due to procedural default. 
We may only consider these claims if McCandless excuses 
his default by showing "cause and prejudice" or a 
"miscarriage of justice." See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 
McCandless, however, makes no attempt to show either. 
Accordingly, we are not free to consider them on their 
merits. 
 
III. 
 
McCandless fairly presented Pennsylvania's courts with 
his IAD claim and his claim that admission of Barth's 
preliminary hearing testimony violated the Confrontation 
Clause. We now consider the merits of these claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
constitutional analysis. In Tann, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted a new trial based upon ineffectiveness of defense counsel for 
failing to object to highly prejudicial and irrelevant prosecutorial 
bolstering. While McCandless's state court briefs cited two federal cases 
considering claims of prosecutorial vouching, these cases did not reach 
constitutional issues for the propositions for which they are cited. See 
United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981) and United States 
v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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A. 
 
The IAD "is a compact which has been adopted by 48 
states, the District of Columbia, and the United States, to 
encourage expeditious and orderly disposition of 
outstanding criminal charges filed against a person 
incarcerated in a different jurisdiction." Cooney v. Fulcomer, 
886 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1989). IAD violations are 
cognizable in federal habeas corpus because the IAD is a 
"law of the United States" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. S 2254. 
See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994)("While the 
IAD is indeed state law, it is a law of the United States as 
well."); Cooney, 886 F.2d at 43 n.1 ("The IAD [was] . . . 
approved by Congress pursuant to the Compact Clause 
[and] . . . is a federal law . . . . Thus, the federal courts 
have habeas corpus jurisdiction . . ."). 
 
The IAD establishes procedures for the transfer of 
prisoners to face criminal prosecution in another state. 
Article V(d) provides: 
 
       The temporary custody referred to in this agreement 
       shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution 
       on the charge or charges contained in one or more 
       untried indictments, informations, or complaints which 
       form the basis of the detainer or detainers or 
       prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out 
       of the same transaction. . . . 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9101. 
 
The parties agree that (i) McCandless was incarcerated in 
New Jersey when Pennsylvania filed murder charges 
against him; (ii) Pennsylvania filed its IAD request based 
upon charges wholly unrelated to the Stebelski murder; 
and (iii) Pennsylvania prosecuted McCandless on the 
murder charge when they gained custody under their IAD 
request. The parties also agree that this clearly violated 
Article V(d). They disagree, however, on whether this IAD 
violation warrants habeas relief. We conclude that our 
decision in Cooney v. Fulcomer, 886 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1989), 
is controlling here and that habeas relief must be denied. 
 
In Cooney, Pennsylvania obtained custody of the habeas 
applicant from New Jersey through an IAD request based 
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upon burglary charges. The state then (i) dismissed the 
burglary charges, (ii) filed new robbery charges based upon 
wholly unrelated events, and (iii) convicted the applicant on 
the robbery charges. See id. at 42. The applicant then 
sought federal habeas corpus relief based upon 
Pennsylvania's violation of IAD Article V(d). See id. at 43. 
We concluded that Pennsylvania had blatantly violated 
Article V(d), but nonetheless held that the applicant was 
not entitled to habeas relief because violation of Article V(d) 
"was not so fundamental as to warrant habeas relief." Id. at 
42.4 
 
McCandless attempts to distinguish Cooney by arguing 
that there the applicant alleged that Pennsylvania's 
violation of Article V(d) deprived him of his "procedural" 
right to contest his transfer before the sending state's 
Governor by knowing the charges upon which his transfer 
was based. By contrast, McCandless contends that he is 
asserting a "substantive" claim that Article V(d) deprived 
the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction--both personal 
and subject matter--to try him for the crimes. He argues 
this is "fundamental" rather than merely procedural. We 
find this argument unavailing. 
 
The Court of Common Pleas did not depend upon the IAD 
for personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Both are 
independently provided by other Pennsylvania statutes. 
Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 931, the Court of Common 
Pleas has "unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and 
proceedings . . . cognizable by law" except where original 
jurisdiction has been delegated to another court in 
Pennsylvania's unified court system. The murder and 
related charges fall within this category. See Commonwealth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We have found violations of other IAD provisions insufficiently 
"fundamental" to warrant habeas relief. See Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 
1283 (3d Cir. 1987) (violation of article III's requirement of trial 
within 
180 days of request by detainee not "fundamental defect" warranting 
habeas relief); Shack v. Attorney Gen. of Pa., 776 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (3d 
Cir. 1985)(violation of article IV(a)'s pre-transfer hearing provision not 
sufficient to allow "the extraordinary sanction of a collateral attack on 
an 
otherwise valid criminal conviction"); but see United States v. Williams, 
615 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1980)(violation of article IV(e)'s antishuttling 
provision "fundamental" enough to warrant habeas relief). 
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v. Matlock, 393 A.2d 26, 28 (Pa. 1978)("The court of 
common pleas has jurisdiction to hear murder cases."). The 
Court of Common Pleas' personal jurisdiction is provided by 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5301(a)(1), which inter alia 
provides personal jurisdiction over individuals who are 
present or domiciled in the Commonwealth when process is 
served. McCandless was present in Pennsylvania when he 
was arrested for the murder charges. Personal jurisdiction 
does not depend upon how McCandless came to be present 
in Pennsylvania. Indeed, as the District Court noted, under 
Supreme Court precedent the Court of Common Pleas 
might even have had jurisdiction if McCandless had been 
brought into Pennsylvania by forcible abduction. Frisbee v. 
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).5  In short, we conclude 
that we are bound by our holding in Cooney that violations 
of IAD Article V(d) are not fundamental enough to warrant 
habeas relief. 
 
B. 
 
We now turn to McCandless's claim that admission of 
Barth's preliminary hearing testimony violated his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees criminal defendants "the right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against [them]." U.S. Const. amend. 6. 
Read literally, this clause "would require, on objection, the 
exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present 
at trial." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. McCandless also argues that the Supreme Court's decisions in United 
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) and Johnson v. Browne, 205 
U.S. 309 (1907), regarding the "rule of specialty" in international 
extradition law, apply to this case. We find this argument unpersuasive. 
In Rauscher, the Court interpreted an extradition treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain as impliedly requiring that individuals 
extradited under the treaty are tried only for the specific offenses upon 
which extradition was sought. 119 U.S. 407. The Browne Court 
reaffirmed this rule of international law in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
205 U.S. 309. These cases did not arise under a domestic statute with 
its own controlling jurisprudence. Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
specifically held that the international law "rule of speciality" does not 
apply to domestic extraditions under the Extradition Clause. Lascelles v. 
Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1893). 
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Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the clause to 
allow admission of non-testifying declarants' out of court 
statements where the prosecution establishes that (i) the 
declarant is "unavailable" and (ii) the statement bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. at 65-6. 
 
When prosecutors seek to admit a non-testifying witness' 
preliminary hearing testimony the Confrontation Clause 
requires two things. First, the prosecution must establish 
that the declarant is "unavailable" by showing that 
"prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to 
obtain [the declarant's] presence at trial." Id. at 74; see also 
United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 808 (3d Cir. 
1982)("The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment 
permits [admission of depositions in criminal trials] when 
the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts 
undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that 
witness."). Judging whether a "good faith" effort has been 
made is "a question of reasonableness," and"the 
prosecution bears the burden of establishing this 
predicate." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-5 (quoting California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970)). Second, to satisfy 
the "indicia of reliability" requirement, the prosecution 
must demonstrate that the defendant had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the 
preliminary hearing. See id. at 73. 
 
McCandless claims that neither of these constitutional 
prerequisites were satisfied for the admission of Barth's 
preliminary hearing testimony. We find it necessary to 
address only the issue of whether Barth was 
constitutionally unavailable.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we find a Confrontation Clause violation based upon the 
prosecution's failure to establish Barth's unavailability, we find it 
unnecessary to address McCandless's additional claim that admission of 
Barth's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because he did not 
have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Barth at the preliminary 
hearing. In his brief, McCandless conceded that he did not present this 
claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and that it is procedurally 
defaulted. He attempted, however, to excuse this default on the ground 
that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise this claim in 
his 
allocatur petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Because the same 
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As noted, we must presume all state court factual 
findings to be correct in our analysis of McCandless's 
Confrontation Clause claim. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). "[W]hile 
the presumption of correctness applies to the basic, 
primary or historical facts, the ultimate issue of 
unavailability for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is a 
mixed question of fact and law, reviewable de novo." 
Martinez v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 921, 926 (10th Cir. 1989); 
see Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Dres v. Campoy, 784 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1986)("[W]e 
review de novo the question of whether the Supreme 
Court's standards for unavailability have been satisfied in 
this case."); see also Thomas v. Gunter, 962 F.2d 1477, 
1483 (10th Cir. 1992)(whether hearsay statements met 
Confrontation Clause's indicia of reliability requirement 
presents "a mixed question of law and fact we review de 
novo"). 
 
The prosecution's Sixth Amendment duty requires it to 
undertake reasonable "good faith" efforts to locate 
witnesses before a court will admit a non-testifying witness' 
preliminary hearing testimony. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74- 
75. The Supreme Court has noted that in fulfilling this 
duty: 
 
       The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, 
       if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
counsel had included this argument in McCandless's Superior Court 
brief, the District Court concluded that the failure to reassert it was a 
strategic decision and not ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
In rebuttal at oral argument, McCandless alternatively argued that he 
had indeed "fairly presented" this claim because he had included it in 
his only state appeal as a matter of right to the Superior Court. 
McCandless requested this Court to consider whether"exhaustion" 
requires an applicant to present claims in state discretionary appeals. 
We are not free to do so. This Court's precedents indicate that habeas 
petitioners must present their federal claims to the state's highest 
court. 
See Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230 ("A claim must be presented not only to the 
trial court but also to the state's intermediate court as well as to its 
supreme court."); Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 861 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Beaty v. Patton, 700 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Boerckel v. 
O'Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir.) cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 508 (1998). 
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       example the witness' intervening death), "good faith" 
       demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a 
       possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures 
       might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith 
       may demand their effectuation. The lengths to which the 
       prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a 
       question of reasonableness. 
 
Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 
The reasonableness of the prosecution's efforts must be 
evaluated with a sensitivity to the surrounding 
circumstances and the defendant's interest in confronting 
the absent witness. Confrontation Clause concerns are 
heightened and courts insist on more diligent efforts by the 
prosecution where a "key" or "crucial" witness' testimony is 
involved. See United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 543 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The more important the witness to the 
government's case, the more important the defendant's 
right, derived from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment"); United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Confrontation Clause considerations `are 
especially cogent when the testimony of a witness is critical 
to the prosecution's case against the defendant.' "); United 
States v. A&S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1133 (4th 
Cir. 1991) ("Where [a case] involves the government's most 
crucial witness, the [Confrontation Clause] concerns are 
especially heightened."); United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 
522, 529 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 
163, 166 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Where the trial court has 
curtailed a defendant's cross-examination of a `star' 
government witness--as it has done in this case--its ruling 
must be more carefully scrutinized."); cf. Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308 (1974) (repeatedly emphasizing cross- 
examination of "key" and "crucial" witness as significant 
factor for determining that defendant's confrontation rights 
outweighed key witness' privacy interest in non-disclosure 
of juvenile record under state law). 
 
The defendant's interest in confrontation is, of course, 
further heightened where the absent witness has special 
reason to give testimony favorable to the prosecution. 
Confrontation Clause protections are " `especially important 
with respect to accomplices or other witnesses who may 
 
                                16 
  
have substantial reason to cooperate with the 
government.' " United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1184 
(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Onori , 535 F.2d 
938, 945 (5th Cir.1976)); see United States v. Greenberg, 
423 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1970) (curtailing cross-examination 
of cooperating co-defendant witness regarding witness' plea 
arrangement with prosecution violated Confrontation 
Clause). 
 
Finally, special sensitivity to Confrontation Clause 
concerns is appropriate where the consequences of a 
conviction based on the absent witness' testimony are 
grave. In a capital case, for example, it is fair to ask more 
of the prosecution than in a situation involving significantly 
less serious consequences. 
 
In this case, McCandless's interest in confrontation with 
Barth could not have been higher. He was charged with an 
offense which carried a mandatory life sentence, and the 
prosecution was seeking the death penalty. Barth was the 
prosecution's only eye witness to the alleged shooting, and 
his testimony was the only substantial evidence implicating 
McCandless in the murder. These factors would have made 
full cross examination before the jury of crucial importance 
to McCandless even if Barth had been a wholly impartial 
witness. But he was not. He had been charged with and 
arrested for the same homicide and had reached an 
agreement with the prosecution that he would go free if he 
testified against McCandless and Hartey and they were 
convicted. With McCandless's acute Sixth Amendment 
interest in confronting Barth in mind, we turn to the 
evidence pertaining to the government's efforts to secure 
Barth's presence at trial. 
 
Barth was arrested and charged with Stebelski's death in 
March of 1981. He agreed to cooperate with the government 
and gave a written statement implicating McCandless in 
September of 1981, a little over a year after the alleged 
crime. The prosecution agreed to support a reduction of 
Barth's bail as part of the cooperation agreement. Barth 
was released on bail and his father, Edward Barth, became 
the surety on his bond. Barth was required to report every 
other week to a designated room in the courthouse where 
he was to sign a subpoena. In February, 1982, Barth failed 
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to report to the designated room and failed to appear at a 
preliminary hearing regarding an unrelated weapons 
charge, which resulted in the issuance of a bench warrant 
for his arrest. Barth was arrested and released. In April, 
1982, Barth again failed to appear in court, this time at a 
preliminary hearing in McCandless's case. Another bench 
warrant was issued and police arrested Barth at his home. 
Barth was temporarily incarcerated at Holmsberg prison, 
but was released on the same bail conditions after testifying 
at McCandless's preliminary hearing. Approximately one 
month later, in early May, 1982, Barth again failed to 
report and yet another bench warrant was issued for his 
arrest on May 14th. This time, however, police were unable 
to find Barth before the McCandless trial commenced on 
August 9, 1982. 
 
Four witnesses testified regarding the Commonwealth's 
efforts to locate and secure Barth's presence at trial after he 
disappeared in early May, 1982. First, Detective Frank 
O'Brien, the detective assigned to the Stebelski murder, 
testified that he told other police officers to keep an eye out 
for Barth and that he personally looked for him when he 
was in Barth's neighborhood "on other business." O'Brien 
admitted, however, that he made no effort to locate Barth 
during the two months prior to McCandless's trial. During 
the month preceding trial, he was on vacation. 
 
Second, Detective Joseph Guerrera, a detective assigned 
by the District Attorney's office to locate and serve Barth 
with a subpoena, testified that he attempted to serve Barth 
with a subpoena on two occasions in July. First, in early 
July, he (i) checked police and prison records, (ii) visited the 
Barth house and slipped a subpoena under the door, and 
(iii) questioned a grocer and neighborhood youth regarding 
Barth's whereabouts. Guerrera repeated these efforts on 
July 27, 1982, less than a week before jury selection 
commenced on August 2, 1982. This time, he spoke with a 
neighbor who told him that Mrs. Barth was at the shore 
and that Barth had been in the neighborhood in June. 
Guerrera never attempted to contact Barth's father, mother 
or siblings because he was "more or less used on a one day 
basis" and his assigned task was to serve Barth and five 
other witnesses in the case with subpoenas. He assumed 
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that the detective assigned to the murder case, Detective 
O'Brien, was investigating Barth's whereabouts. 
 
Third, Detective Tyres, a detective assigned to locate 
Barth one week before trial, testified that he (i) checked 
police, prison and Department of Public Assistance records, 
and (ii) went to the Barth residence where he spoke to Mrs. 
Barth and a man he assumed to be Barth's brother on 
August 4, 1982. Both claimed to have no knowledge of 
Barth's whereabouts. 
 
Finally, Joan Burren, a representative from Pretrial 
Services ("ROR"), read the notations from Barth's ROR file 
detailing that department's efforts to locate Barth. ROR's 
activities centered around three dates. First, after the 
bench warrant was issued in May, the ROR made a series 
of unsuccessful phone calls to the Barth home to schedule 
a "walk in" surrender. Mrs. Barth advised that Barth no 
longer lived there. Second, on July 1, 1982, ROR officers 
visited the Barth house, found the door open, and searched 
the home, but found the residence empty. Third, on August 
6, 1982, an ROR officer called Mrs. Barth, who reported 
that she had met Barth two weeks earlier in Dover, 
Delaware. She gave no further information, but the officer's 
notation indicated that he believed that she knew Barth's 
location because the meeting was pre-arranged. Following 
this conversation, the officer sought to obtain the Barth 
residence phone records of all calls to and from Delaware. 
The telephone company representative, however, refused to 
surrender the information without a warrant. No warrant 
was sought. An ROR officer also called the Dover police 
department, which returned the call forty minutes later 
indicating that they had no record of Barth in Delaware. 
Finally, a call was made to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Motor Vehicles. 
 
Burren also testified that ROR knew Barth's parents' 
identity and address, and that they knew that Barth's 
father was the surety for Barth's bond. Nonetheless, no 
effort was made to contact Barth's parents or siblings. No 
federal warrant was sought. 
 
Thus, the record shows the following. The government 
supported a bail reduction that allowed Barth to gain his 
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freedom. After two failures to appear, two bench warrants 
and two rearrests, it sought no alteration in conditions of 
his bail. In early May of 1982, three months before trial, 
Barth failed to appear for the third time and a bench 
warrant was issued. Follow-up calls by Barth's pre-trial 
services officers established that Barth could not be 
expected to voluntarily cooperate. As of mid-May, two and 
a half months prior to trial, it is fair to say that Barth's 
presence at trial would not be assured unless the 
prosecution took affirmative action to secure it. Its response 
to this situation over the next ten weeks can only be 
described as casual. 
 
These efforts focused around two dates. First, 
approximately one month before trial in early July, 
prosecutorial authorities checked Pennsylvania police and 
prison records and twice unsuccessfully visited the Barth 
household, once slipping a subpoena under the door. 
Second, in the week immediately preceding jury selection 
and trial in early August, authorities repeated these efforts. 
In the month between these dates prosecutorial authorities 
were idle. This was perhaps attributable to the fact that the 
detective assigned to the case was on vacation, and the 
Assistant District Attorney who tried the case did not 
receive her assignment until one week before trial. Neither 
explanation, however, can excuse the consequent 
infringement of constitutional rights. 
 
Nothing in the record suggests that Mrs. Barth was 
avoiding authorities, yet officials delayed serious efforts to 
question her about Barth's whereabouts until August 4th, 
two days after jury selection commenced. When an ROR 
officer talked to Mrs. Barth two days later, he learned that 
she had met Barth in Dover, Delaware just two weeks 
earlier. Drawing the reasonable inference that the meeting 
might have been prearranged by telephone, and that other 
telephone contacts might have taken place, the officer 
attempted to get the telephone company to voluntarily 
provide the McCandless residence phone records, but did 
not expend the minimal effort necessary to follow up with 
a warrant. Moreover, despite the officer's notation that this 
meeting had been prearranged, no follow up was made to 
further press Mrs. Barth regarding her husband's location. 
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With regard to Barth's possible presence in Delaware, 
authorities simply accepted the quick assurance of the 
Dover police that they had no record of Barth. 
 
Finally, we note that prosecutorial authorities did not 
contact Barth's parents or siblings. Indeed, they did not 
even call Barth's father whom they knew to have both a 
financial and familial incentive to keep track of Barth.7 
 
Given Barth's crucial role in the prosecution's case, we 
are left with the firm conviction that the prosecution's 
efforts to assure Barth's presence would have been far less 
casual had the shoe been on the other foot. If the 
prosecution had not had Barth's preliminary hearing 
testimony and had needed Barth's presence at trial, we are 
confident that the resources and effort devoted tofinding 
him prior to trial would have been greater than they in fact 
were. To countenance such a disparity would ill serve the 
interests protected by the Confrontation Clause. See United 
States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 367 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting 
that "[t]he government did not make as vigorous an attempt 
to secure the presence of the witness as it would have made 
if it did not have the prior recorded testimony."); Lynch, 499 
F.2d at 1024 ("It is difficult to believe that if the preliminary 
hearing testimony of this critical witness were not available, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The four witnesses who testified about the efforts of the state to 
secure 
Barth's presence did so during the week before trial. After hearing their 
testimony, the trial judge was sufficiently concerned about the situation 
that he directed the ROR officer to contact Barth's family over the 
weekend preceding trial. On August 9, the day trial commenced, the 
prosecutor informed the trial judge that ROR officers had unsuccessfully 
attempted to contact Barth's brother, but had spoken with Barth's 
parents who told them that they had not seen Barth in months. Defense 
counsel refused to stipulate to the prosecutor's summary of ROR efforts 
and instead demanded the opportunity to cross-examine the officer. The 
trial judge then announced his ruling that Barth was unavailable, and 
requested the prosecution to continue its efforts to locate Barth. We have 
reviewed the record and have found no other discussion of the ROR's 
efforts to locate Barth before his testimony was read to the jury. This 
information does change our analysis. In light of defense counsel's 
refusal to stipulate to this information, the trial judge's decision was 
based upon the prior information received in court. Accordingly, we 
believe that our focus must be on the record of the prosecutorial efforts 
established in the trial court's evidentiary hearing discussed above. 
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the prosecution would have abandoned its efforts at this 
point to locate [the witness]."). Accordingly, we hold that 
Barth was not constitutionally unavailable and that the 
prosecution's use of Barth's preliminary hearing testimony 
violated McCandless's rights under the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Given the facts we have recounted, we believe the District 
Court's reliance on Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), was 
misplaced. There, the defendant was indicted and convicted 
of forgery and receiving stolen property. An acquaintance of 
the defendant, Anita, testified at the defendant's 
preliminary hearing but did not appear at trial. The 
prosecution sought to introduce Anita's preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial, and offered the following evidence to 
establish Anita's "unavailability": 
 
       Anita, according to her mother, left home for Tucson, 
       Ariz., soon after the preliminary hearing. About a year 
       before the trial, a San Francisco social worker was in 
       communication with [her parents] about a welfare 
       application Anita had filed there. Through the social 
       worker, the [parents] reached their daughter once by 
       telephone. Since then, however, Anita had called her 
       parents only one other time and had not been in touch 
       with her two sisters. When Anita called, some seven or 
       eight months before trial, she told her parents that she 
       `was traveling' outside Ohio, but did not reveal the 
       place from which she called. . . . [Her mother] knew of 
       no way to reach Anita in case of an emergency. Nor did 
       she `know of anybody who knows where she is.' 
 
Id. 59-60. The Supreme Court concluded that Anita was 
"unavailabl[e] in the constitutional sense." Id. at 75. The 
court noted that prosecutors had taken affirmative steps to 
locate Anita by contacting her parents at Anita's last known 
address, but that the prosecutors had "no clear indication, 
if any at all, of Anita's whereabouts." Id. at 75-6. The Court 
further found no constitutional violation in the 
prosecution's failure to contact the San Francisco social 
worker because "the great improbability that such efforts 
would have resulted in locating the witness, and would 
have led to her production at trial, neutralize[d] any 
intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their 
execution." Id. at 76. 
 
                                22 
  
We find McCandless's case materially different. First, the 
Roberts prosecutors had no current reliable lead regarding 
Anita's location; they knew nothing more about Anita's 
whereabouts than that she was "traveling" outside the state 
and had stopped in San Francisco a year earlier. Here, 
however, authorities had a fresh lead from Mrs. Barth. 
Their failure to adequately investigate this fresh lead is not 
comparable to a failure to follow up on the year-old tip that 
Anita had been in San Francisco. Second, the facts of 
Roberts did not trigger heightened Sixth Amendment 
concerns because (i) Anita's testimony was not as crucial to 
the prosecution's case as Barth's was in the instant case, 
and (ii) the Roberts defendant was charged with the 
relatively minor crimes of forgery and possession of stolen 
property, not capital murder. Finally, the prosecution in 
Roberts had no connection or relationship with Anita 
comparable to the cooperation agreement in this case. 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that McCandless failed to fairly present his 
double hearsay and prosecutorial vouching claims to 
Pennsylvania's courts, and that his unexcused procedural 
default of those claims precludes their review in federal 
habeas corpus. We will also reject McCandless's claim for 
habeas relief based upon Pennsylvania's violation of Article 
V(d) of the IAD because, under our circuit jurisprudence, 
violations of Article V(d) do not justify habeas relief. 
 
We conclude, however, that the prosecution did not 
satisfy its Sixth Amendment duty to make reasonable good 
faith efforts to obtain Barth's presence at trial. Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand with instructions that it order McCandless's release 
from confinement unless he is retried and convicted within 
a reasonable time. 
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